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over the peirod 1951-1974, we provide evidence that increased reporting frequency enhances the 
extent to which stock price guides managers’ investment decisions. Using a generalized difference-
in-differences research design, we find the sensitivity of investment to stock price (measured by 
Tobin’s Q) increased for treatment firms following an increase in reporting frequency, relative to 
control firms. The results are more pronounced among firms traded by more informed investors, 
measured by price nonsynchronicity and stock illiquidity. Consistent with managers making better 
investment decisions when stock prices provide more investment-relevant information, we find 
future operating performance of the treatment firms improves following the increase in reporting 
frequency. Our findings are consistent with the “crowding-in effect” theorized in Goldstein and 
Yang (2019). Our results are relevant to the ongoing regulatory debates in the United States and 
European Union regarding how frequently firms should be required to report their financial results.  
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1. Introduction 
An important aspect of any financial reporting framework is how frequently firms are 
mandated to report their financial statements. Mandatory reporting frequency is an important but 
difficult regulatory design choice because it fundamentally affects the information environment 
for publicly traded firms. The difficulty in determining the optimal reporting frequency occurs 
because reporting frequency affects the incentives of numerous market participants, including 
analysts, investors, creditors, competitors, as well as managers, in diverse and often imperfectly 
understood ways. Not surprisingly, financial reporting frequency has been a controversial issue 
subject to much policy debate globally. For example, the European Union recently removed an 
earlier requirement for quarterly reporting while the Unites States is currently considering whether 
to reduce reporting frequency. Analyzing the effects of financial reporting frequency is difficult 
because there are relatively few research settings where reporting frequency varies across firms or 
across time. Thus, the literature on financial reporting frequency is relatively undeveloped. We 
add to this literature by examining how reporting frequency affects managers’ ability to learn 
investment-related information from their stock prices.  
We assume that managers use all available information when making their investment 
decisions, including any information about current or future investment opportunities that are 
embedded in stock prices. Managers know much of the firm-specific information in stock prices. 
However, prices also reflect how industry- and macro-level information relates to their firm and 
managers are relatively less informed about this type of information Hutton et al. (2012).1 To the 
extent stock prices incorporate information about the firm’s investment opportunities that is new 
to managers, they can learn valuable information about the value of their firm’s investment 
                                                 
1 For example, Hutton et al. (2012) show that financial analysts enjoy a comparative advantage over managers in 
macro information. 
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opportunities from stock prices (Bakke and Whited 2010; Chen et al. 2007, 2017; Edmans et al. 
2017; Foucault and Fresard 2012; Jayaraman and Wu 2019).  
The degree to which more frequent financial reporting changes the investment usefulness 
of stock prices depends on how it affects the private information search activities of informed 
investors and information intermediaries, such as analysts and the press (Demski and Feltham 1994; 
Kim and Verrecchia 1991; McNichols and Trueman 1994; Verrecchia 2001). Goldstein and Yang 
(2019) analytically show that when firms publicly disclose more information that the manager is 
already aware of, it increases investors’ incentives to acquire types of private information that are 
unknown to the manager (i.e., the two types of information are substitutes). Since managers are 
already knowledgeable about the information contained in the financial reports, we predict the 
investment usefulness of stock prices increases following an increase in reporting frequency.  
To provide evidence on this important issue, we examine changes in U.S. firms’ financial 
reporting frequency over the period 1951-1974. During this period, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) first increased the mandatory reporting frequency from annual to semi-annual 
in 1955 and then from semi-annual to quarterly in 1970. While most firms had voluntarily 
increased their reporting frequency prior to these actions, there were a substantial number of 
mandatory adopters that did not increase their reporting frequency until mandated by the SEC. 
While dated, this setting provides a powerful setting to examine the effects of changes in reporting 
frequency (Butler et al. 2007; Fu et al. 2012; Kraft et al. 2018).  
We use investment-to-price sensitivity (hereafter, IPS) to measure the degree to which 
managers learn new information about the value of their investment opportunities from stock 
prices (Bakke and Whited 2010; Chen et al. 2007; Edmans et al. 2017; Foucault and Fresard 2012; 
Jayaraman and Wu 2019). In our primary empirical tests, we examine how increased reporting 
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frequency affects IPS for treatment firms relative to control firms that did not change reporting 
frequency in a generalized difference-in-differences framework where Tobin’s Q is used to 
measure stock price. Consistent with prior literature, we measure investments using (1) one-year-
ahead change in property, plant, and equipment and (2) one-year-ahead capital expenditure.  
Our primary results indicate IPS significantly increased for treatment firms following the 
increase in reporting frequency compared to control firms. Further tests indicate the increase in 
reporting frequency resulted in long-lasting increases in IPS as the effects are significant for at 
least five years following the increase in reporting frequency. The results are economically 
significant as well. Thus, consistent with our hypothesis, the evidence indicates managers of 
treatment firms behaved as if their stock prices contained more information about investment 
opportunities when they made their investment decisions during the post-adoption period.2 
 We expect our results are driven the “crowding-in” effect developed in Goldstein and 
Yang (2019), whereby more frequent financial reports (of which mangers already know) 
incentivizes sophisticated investors to search for more private information that is unrelated to the 
financial reports. In which case, we expect the effects of reporting frequency on IPS will be 
concentrated among treatment firms that experience the greatest increase in informed trading. 
Following prior literature (Chen et al. 2007; Jayaraman and Wu 2019), we use stock price 
nonsynchronicity (1-R2) and the Amihud's (2002) stock illiquidity to proxy for the amount of 
trading by informed investors, and by extension, the amount of private investment-relevant 
                                                 
2 An alternative explanation for our results is the financial constraints channel posited by (Baker et al. 2003). They 
find investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger for financially constrained firms who depend on equity financing to 
fund their investments. In other words, investment varies with stock price because higher (lower) stock prices increase 
(decrease) their ability to fund investments. The financial constraints channel predicts higher IPS among more equity-
dependent firms. If treatment firms are more financially constrained and increasing reporting frequency increases 
stock prices by reducing the cost of capital (Fu et al. 2012), then our results could be due to the financial constraints 
channel. However, we find the increase in IPS is driven by less equity-dependent firms, who can more easily adjust 
their investment levels in response to new information (Chen et al. 2007; Edmans et al. 2017). 
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information incorporated in stock prices. Our results show the increase in the IPS is among firms 
with more trading based on private-information. Thus, our evidence is consistent with the 
prediction in Goldstein and Yang (2019) such that more frequent financial reporting leads to more 
informed trading, which in turns increases the usefulness of stock prices to managers’ investment 
decisions.    
One implication of the prior results is that managers at treatment firms will have made 
relatively more informed investment decisions after the increase in reporting frequency given 
additional investment-related information available in stock prices. In which case, we expect the 
future operating performance of treatment firms will be enhanced relative to control firms as they 
make better investment decisions. Consistent with this implication, we find future operating 
performance over the following one, two, and three years is significantly higher for treatment firms 
following their increase in reporting frequency relative to control firms. Thus, our results indicate 
a real effect of reporting frequency on the quality of firms’ investment decisions. 
We contribute to extant literature in three primary ways. First, we contribute to relatively 
undeveloped literature that examines the costs and benefits of financial reporting frequency. 
Kothari et al. (2010) argues that efficient capital allocation is (or at least should be) the ultimate 
aim of financial reporting. By this measure, prior literature has provided mixed evidence on the 
desirability of mandating quarterly financial reporting relative to semi-annual reporting. While Fu 
et al. (2012) and to a lesser extent Butler et al. (2007) find evidence consistent with more frequent 
reporting increasing the information content of stock prices, the results in Kraft et al. (2018) and 
Fu et al. (2019) suggests quarterly reporting reduces allocational efficiency. We contribute to this 
literature by examining how reporting frequency affects the amount of new investment-related 
information that managers can learn from stock prices – a construct that is directly related to 
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allocational efficiency. We find that higher reporting frequency indirectly leads to better informed 
investment decisions by managers.  
Second, we contribute to the investment-price sensitivity literature that provides evidence 
of a causal link between changes in the informativeness of stock prices and changes in investment-
price sensitivity (Edmans et al. 2017; Foucault and Frésard 2012; Jayaraman and Wu 2018). In our 
setting, we find managers’ reliance on stock prices when making investment decisions increases 
following an increase in financial reporting frequency. Given that managers are already aware of 
the information disclosed in their own firm’s financial statements, these disclosures are not 
expected to directly increase the investment-related information in stock prices. Instead, our results 
indicate that the increase in public disclosures leads to an increase in private information search 
activity, which in turn increases the investment relevant information in prices. As such, our results 
are consistent with the theoretical prediction in Goldstein and Yang (2019).3 
Third, we contribute to the broader literature that examines the costs and benefits of 
mandated public information disclosures. We document positive informational effects for financial 
markets, and consequently managers’ investment decisions, following an increase in reporting 
frequency. Our findings suggest that mandating the disclosure of information already known by 
managers can ultimately benefit firms by providing managers with new information about the 
firm’s investment opportunities. Our results indicate increasing reporting frequency shifted the 
distribution of private information search activities towards (away from) private information that 
was new to managers (public information that was known to managers). This result is in contrast 
to previous studies documenting a substitution effect between public disclosures and private 
                                                 
3 Jayaraman and Wu (2019) find a reduction in IPS following a mandatory increase in segment reporting disclosures. 
They interpret their results as indicating increased disclosure reduced investors’ incentives to acquire private 
information that would be useful to managers. Thus, their results are only consistent with the prediction in Goldstein 
and Yang (2019) segment-related disclosures are compliments to managers’ information sets, rather than substitutes. 
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information search activities (Brown and Hillegeist 2007; Healy et al. 1999; Welker 1995). As 
such, our findings highlight the importance of understanding how different types of disclosures 
differentially affect private search activities (Edmans et al. 2017; Goldstein and Yang 2019). 
Overall, our evidence adds to our understanding of the nuanced effects of financial 
reporting frequency on investors’ information search decisions and managerial learning from stock 
prices. Accordingly, our paper has implications for regulators in the U.S. and Europe as they 
continue to debate the merits of quarterly reporting. The evidence in our paper suggests the recent 
decision by both the EU and the U.K. to abandon the mandatory quarterly reporting requirement 
could have reduced the ability of managers to learn information about their investment 
opportunities from stock prices - a previously unexplored benefit of more frequent reporting. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional background related to 
financial reporting frequency in the U.S. and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our data, 
sample, and research design. Section 4 presents our empirical findings, while the conclusion is in 
Section 5. 
2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Institutional Background 
Before the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts), 
financial reporting was primarily governed by stock exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), in particular, began requiring some newly listed firms to periodically report profit and 
balance sheet information around the turn of the century, and by 1923, required all newly listed 
firms to publish quarterly financial statements. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and 
regional exchanges did not take similar steps until the early 1960s (Taylor 1963). The SEC took 
an active role in regulating reporting frequency for exchange-listed firms starting with the 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which mandated annual reporting in 1934, continuing with 
semiannual reporting in 1955, and finally mandating quarterly reporting in 1970.  
Beyond these mandatory requirements, the NYSE pressured already-listed companies to 
publish quarterly reports. In both 1926 and 1931, the NYSE approached all companies that had 
not already agreed to report quarterly, asking them to amend their listing agreements to include 
this reporting frequency requirement (NYSE, 1939).4 These efforts were reasonably successful as 
the percentage of NYSE firms reporting quarterly (semi-annually) increase from 25% to 37% (8% 
to 15%) in 1927 and further increased to 63% (17%) in 1932 (NYSE, 1939). By the mid-1950s 
(1962), the NYSE’s efforts were mostly successful, as 89.5% (95%) of the active domestic 
companies on the NYSE were publishing earnings reports quarterly (Taylor 1963).5  
In contrast to the NYSE, the AMEX nor the regional exchanges were uniformly opposed 
to mandating more frequent reporting and repeatedly opposed all related SEC proposals to do so.6 
This opposition appeared to be motivated by a concern that some firms, finding the regulations too 
burdensome, might choose to delist and trade over the counter. Additionally, a quarterly reporting 
regime for all listed firms would mean less differentiation between the NYSE and non-NYSE 
exchanges, leaving fewer reasons for firms not to move to the NYSE. 
In later years, the AMEX and the other exchanges softened their stance and also adopted 
requirements that newly listed corporations report on a quarterly basis. The AMEX adopted this 
requirement for new firms starting in 1962, and also sent a letter to all listed companies with the 
                                                 
4 In 1939, the NYSE published an article entitled “Exchange Encourages Interim Financial Reports” in the New York 
Stock Exchange Bulletin, vol. X, no. 8 (August 1939). This article reports the progress made by the NYSE in getting 
firms to report quarterly, including the efforts it undertook during the 1920s. 
5 Letter dated March 7, 1955 to the SEC from G. Keith Funston, President of the NYSE (Taylor 1963). 
6 For example, in response to an SEC proposal in 1955 requiring companies to report semi-annually, the president of 
the AMEX, Edward McCormick, sent a letter dated February 28, 1955 to the SEC firmly opposing this measure. 
(Taylor 1963). 
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new requirements asking them to report quarterly if they did not already do so.7 However, not all 
AMEX companies complied with this request. 
In 1945, the SEC took steps to have companies report their financial information more 
frequently than annually (see Figure 1 for a timeline of the SEC’s actions). The move toward more 
frequent reporting stemmed from the SEC’s concern that firms whose sales were dominated by 
war contracts would have large reductions in business and that investors might be caught off-guard. 
In July 1945, the SEC adopted a rule requiring firms with war business in excess of 25% of sales 
in the prior year to file a quarterly report using the form 8-K, containing total sales, sales made 
pursuant to war contracts, and unfilled orders.8 In 1946, the SEC adopted a rule requiring all firms 
to report revenues on a quarterly basis, with exceptions for certain industries.9 Although the SEC 
preferred that firms report income along with the sales information, it ultimately did not include 
this as a requirement, apparently acquiescing to public criticisms that quarterly income information 
would be unreliable and potentially misleading due to the seasonal nature of some businesses. 
In the early 1950s, the SEC wavered on requiring quarterly reporting. It first proposed 
quarterly reporting of income information, then abandoned the proposal, and later rescinded even 
its quarterly sales reporting requirements before finally mandating semi-annual reporting of 
income. Proposed in January 1955 and adopted in June of that year, the switch to semi-annual 
reporting required firms to provide semi-annual reports within 45 days of the end of the first half 
of the fiscal year.10 Firms were required to report sales, net income (before and after taxes), and 
all extraordinary and special items. 
                                                 
7 American Stock Exchange, Listing Standards, Policies and Requirements (New York: The Exchange, 1962, 3) 
(Taylor 1963). 
8 SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3718, July 23, 1945. 
9 SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3803, March 28, 1946. 
10 See SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 5129, January 27, 1955 for proposal and SEC, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 5189, June 23, 1955 for adoption. 
10 
 
The SEC did not reconsider quarterly reporting until the end of the 1960s when the Wheat 
Commission proposed it. As a result, in September 1969, the SEC proposed that companies be 
required to file quarterly reports on a new Form 10-Q. The proposal was adopted in October 
1970.11 Thereafter, firms had to report detailed profit and loss information, earnings per share, and 
information on the issuer’s capitalization and shareholders’ equity. The rule went into effect for 
fiscal quarters ending after December 31, 1970, although a few select industries such as life 
insurance companies and public utilities were exempt from the requirement.  
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
How mandatory disclosures in general, and financial reporting frequency in particular, 
affect the information environment depends on whether and how they affect the production of 
additional private information by various market participants. Identifying these information 
production effects and how they interact with each other is especially complex because accounting 
reports can either act as substitutes or complement to information produced by market participants 
and sometimes both at the same time. For example, consider how the release of financial 
statements can affect the information production activities of analysts. To the extent that analysts 
are concerned with near-term forecasting activities, then more frequent financial reporting will act 
as a substitute for analysts’ reports. By releasing more of the managers’ private information about 
upcoming earnings, more frequent reporting reduces information asymmetry about future earnings, 
and hence, the demand for earnings forecasts by analysts (Healy and Palepu 2001). In contrast, 
more frequent reporting can complement work done by analysts through reducing the cost of 
forecasting earnings (Bhushan 1989a, 1989b; Lang and Lundholm 1993). These cost reductions 
                                                 
11 SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 8683, October 15, 1969 and SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Release No. 9004, October 28, 1970. 
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can enabling analysts to improve stock recommendations by focusing on how industry and market 
developments will affect future earnings growth and risk.12 
Prior empirical research shows that financial reporting frequency affects firms’ information 
environments in several ways, including the information content of annual reports (McNichols and 
Manegold 1983), earnings timeliness (Alford et al. 1993; Butler et al. 2007), and real earnings 
management (Ernstberger et al. 2017). These changes in the information environment will affect 
the information search activities of large, sophisticated investors (including institutional investors, 
short sellers, and hedge funds) by changing the costs and benefits of searching for private 
information as well as types of private information they search for. As discussed below, whether 
the net effect of all of these changes in private information search activities is to increase or 
decrease the investment-related information in stock prices is theoretically ambiguous (Edmans et 
al. 2015; Goldstein and Yang 2015, 2019). 
Managers do not have perfect information about their firms’ growth or investment 
opportunities (Bond et al. 2012). Managers who attempt to maximize expected firm value will use 
all information available to them when making corporate investment decisions. One source of 
investment-relevant information is the firm’s stock price. Stock price aggregates public and private 
information from the trading activity of diverse investors (Dow and Gorton 1997; Grossman and 
Stiglitz 1980). Thus, stock prices reflect at least some private information that is otherwise 
unknown to managers. Managers can achieve a more efficient allocation of corporate resources, 
                                                 
12 A mandatory increase in financial reporting frequency can reduce voluntary disclosures by the firm due to an 
increase in the overall cost of disclosure (including production and dissemination costs, legal costs, and proprietary 
costs or a reduction in the benefit of each additional disclosure ( Gigler and Hemmer 1998, 2001). Also see (Einhorn 
2005). Thus, changes in voluntary disclosures can offset some of the effects of the increase in reporting frequency.  
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and hence, a higher firm value, by incorporating this new (to the manager) information into their 
investment decisions (Bond et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2007; Edmans et al. 2017).13  
The degree to which managers can learn about the value of their investment opportunities 
from stock prices depends on the extent to which managers and informed investors have different 
types of private information. Typically, managers are expected to have superior information about 
internal firm conditions while outside investors are more informed about industry and macro-
economic conditions. Both types of information are relevant for making investment decisions. The 
extent to which the manager relies on stock prices to make investment decisions directly depends 
on the extent to which outside investors search for and trade on private information that is both 
relevant to the firm’s investment decisions and unknown to the manager (Edmans et al. 2017). For 
example, if outside investors search for and trade on private information about upcoming earnings, 
these activities are unlikely to provide the manager with new information about the firm’s 
investment opportunities. In contrast, search activities focused on how developments at 
competitors, suppliers, or customers will affect the firms are likely to produce private information 
that is both new to the manager and highly relevant to her investment decisions. Not all private 
information in stock prices increases the extent to which price reveals new investment relevant 
information to managers (Bond et al. 2012; Dow and Gorton 1997; Edmans et al. 2017; Jayaraman 
and Wu 2019).  
In summary, whether more frequent financial reporting leads to an increase in IPS depends 
on whether informed investors (and market participants in general) increase or decrease the search 
                                                 
13 The following is a real-world example of managers learning from stock prices that is cited in Edmans et al. (2015, 
3767):  “A classic example of how information from the stock market can shape real decisions is Coca-Cola’s 
attempted acquisition of Quaker Oats. On November 20, 2000, the Wall Street Journal reported that Coca-Cola was 
in talks to acquire Quaker Oats. Shortly thereafter, Coca-Cola confirmed such discussions. The market reacted 
negatively, sending Coca-Cola’s shares down 8 percent on November 20 and 2 percent on November 21. Coca-Cola’s 
board rejected the acquisition later on November 21, potentially due to the negative market reaction. The following 
day, Coca-Cola’s shares rebounded 8 percent”. 
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activities for private investment-related information that is new to managers. One possible 
outcome is that more frequent reporting crowds out informed trading, thereby reducing the amount 
of private investment-related information impounded in stock prices. Another possible outcome is 
that more frequent reporting causes investors to focus their search activities on private investment-
related information that is new to managers. Goldstein and Yang (2019) develop a model to 
analyze how the type of information the firm publicly discloses affects investors’ search activities, 
and hence, whether IPS increases or decreases.   
The key finding in Goldstein and Yang (2019) is that the net effect depends on whether the 
public disclosure is about information that the manager (outside investors) is relatively more 
informed about. In the first case, the manager makes a disclosure about information that they know 
with higher precision than outside investors. This disclosure causes investors focus their search 
activities on other types of information about which the manager has relatively less precise 
information. In this case, the search activities cause more information that is new to the manager 
to be incorporated into stock prices (and hence, increases IPS). In the second case, the manager 
makes a disclosure about information that they know with relatively lower precision. This type of 
disclosure causes investors to focus their search activities on private information that the manager 
already knows with high precision (and hence, decreases IPS).14  
We expect managers have the most precise information about the information disclosed in 
interim financial reports for two reasons. First, managers have superior information about internal 
firm conditions, and it is these conditions that are reflected in the interim financial statements. 
                                                 
14 Jayaraman and Wu (2019) find IPS decreases after firms are required to make new segment disclosures. They 
interpret segment disclosures are related to segment-level competition, which is a type of information about which 
managers are relatively less informed. As a consequence, investors focus their search activities on information that 
the manager is relatively more informed. Thus, their search activities reduce the amount of new investment-related 
information in stock prices. In which case, their results are consistent with the prediction in Goldstein and Yang (2019). 
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Second, the information contained in the reports is unlikely to represent new information to the 
manager because this type of information is generated internally to manage the business even when 
it is not required to be disclosed. Thus, we expect that more frequent financial reporting reflects 
more precise public information that managers already know, and hence, our setting corresponds 
to the first case in Goldstein and Yang (2019). Accordingly, we make the following hypothesis (in 
alternative form):  
Hypothesis: The sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price increases when the frequency of 
financial reporting increases.  
3. Data, Sample, and Research Design 
3.1 Data and Sample  
The data employed in this paper comes from various sources. We use Compustat for 
accounting data and CRSP for stock and liquidity data. Data on the financial reporting frequency 
is obtained from Butler et al. (2007). Reporting frequency data was collected by them from 
Moody’s Industrial News Reports (refer to Butler et al. (2007) for further details about data 
composition and original sample). We use reporting frequency data to derive two samples of 
treatment firms matched with equal number of control firms. The first sample of treatment firms 
includes all firms that voluntarily or involuntarily increased their reporting frequency (i.e., the full 
sample). The second sample only consists of firms that involuntarily increased their reporting 
frequency (i.e., the mandatory sample). The mandatory sample consists of firms that increased 
their reporting frequency because of the two SEC mandates by the SEC in years 1955 and 1970 or 
due to pressure by the AMEX to report on a quarterly basis around year 1962. Following Kraft et 
al. (2018), we define treatment firms as the firms that did not change the reporting frequency during 
the two-year period prior to the treatment year. The final number of full (mandatory) sample is 
886 (492). Table 1, Panel A reports the distribution of treatment firms that increased reporting 
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frequency for both samples. Full sample also include firms that voluntarily increased their 
reporting frequency to three times per year. 
The set of possible control firms consists of all firms that did not change reporting 
frequency during the five years around the treatment year (i.e., (-2, +2), where year 0 is the 
treatment year). We identify a matched control sample using propensity score matching’s nearest 
neighbour matching technique. To ensure high quality matching, observations that fall outside the 
common support are dropped (Smith and Todd 2005). In every treatment firm-year, we match our 
treatment firms with control firms based on firm size, sales growth, leverage, profitability, and 
industry (i.e., Fama-French twelve industry classification). Sales growth proxies for growth 
opportunities (Shin and Stulz 1998; Whited 2006; Badertscher et al. 2013); size, profitability, and 
leverage proxy for the availability of financing to engage in investment (Kaplan and Zingales 1997; 
Hadlock and Pierce 2010). We match relatively broadly on industry due to sample attrition issues, 
however, as discussed below, our regression specifications include industry-year interactive 
effects, which fully account for the effect of any time-varying industry differences across firms 
(Gormley and Matsa 2014).  
Table 1, Panel B presents the mean values of the variables used for matching. As can be 
seen, the treatment and control firms are almost identical on these dimensions. T-tests for 
differences in the mean levels of firm size, sales growth, profitability, and leverage across 
treatment and control firms in the treatment year show that we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal means. Thus, our matching procedure appears to yield satisfactory matching 
quality for reliable inferences. 
We provide additional descriptive statistics for the full and mandatory samples in Panels 
A and B of Table 2, respectively. By construction, the size of the full sample is substantially larger 
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than the size of the mandatory sample (11,364 firm-year observations vs. 6,180 firm-year 
observations). Comparing the descriptive statistics across the two samples, the mean and median 
values are very similar.  
Table 3 tabulates the correlations between our primary variables. As expected, our two 
measures of investment are highly correlated (0.789 and 0.786 for the full and mandatory samples, 
respectively). In addition, Q is positively associated with future investments (correlations are 
between 0.18 and 0.20), which is consistent with stock prices being positively associated with 
future investment opportunities.  
3.2 Research Design 
The sensitivity of managers’ investment decisions to their firm’s stock price (IPS) is 
commonly interpreted as the extent to which managers learn new private information about the 
value of their firm’s investment opportunities from stock prices (Bakke and Whited 2010; Chen et 
al. 2007; Edmans et al. 2017; Foucault and Fresard 2012, 2014; Jayaraman and Wu 2019). 
Accordingly, we test our main hypothesis using a difference-in-differences approach that 
compares changes in IPS before versus after the increase in reporting frequency of treatment firms. 
The design is similar to prior research in this area (Edmans et al. 2017; Foucault and Fresard 2012; 
Jayaraman and Wu 2019). Specifically, we estimate the following difference-in-differences 
regression to test our predictions: 
yi,t+1=	αi	+	αt×αind	+	β1Qi,t+ β2TREAT×Qi,t+ β3POST×Qi,t+β4TREAT×POST×Qi,t 									+ β5TREAT×POSTi,t+β6POSTi,t+β7POST×CFi,t+β8TREAT×POST×CFi,t	+	β9CFi,t							ሺ1ሻ 
        +	β10SIZEi,t	+	β11LEVERAGEi,t+	β12SALESGROWTHi,t+β13	LIQUIDITYi,t+	εi,t			 
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where i (t; ind) indexes firms (years; industry), yi,t+1  is one year ahead change in investment 
(CHG_PPE or CAPEX),15 ߙ௜, ߙ௧, and ߙ௜௡ௗ are firm, year, and industry fixed effects, respectively. 
Q is Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as market value of assets divided by book value of assets. 
TREAT is an indicator variable that equals one for treatment firms, and zero otherwise. POST is 
an indicator variable that equals one for years after the treatment year, and zero otherwise. As in 
(Kraft et al. 2018), we include data for up to five years before and after the treatment year, i.e., (-
5, +5) for our sample firms (both treatment and control) excluding the treatment year (0). Since Q 
is a price-based measure of investment opportunities, we also include a non-price-based measure, 
CF (cash flows) in our regression specification as a benchmark. Other time-varying control 
variables include firm size, leverage, sales growth, and liquidity. We cluster standard errors by 
firm. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
As Kraft et al. (2018) discuss, our results setting has certain features which serve to mitigate 
concerns that our results could be driven by contemporaneous changes in growth opportunities. In 
addition to the difference-in-differences design and various controls for time-varying factors and 
firm characteristics related to growth opportunities, the timing of reporting frequency increases is 
determined exogenously and the shocks to reporting frequency changes are staggered in time. Thus, 
our research setting and design is robust and allows us to make relatively precise make causal 
inferences about any changes in IPS for treatment firms after increases in reporting frequency.  
Our main coefficient of interest in Equation (1) is the 4 coefficient on the interaction term 
TREAT×POST×Qi,t , which captures the effect of reporting frequency increases on IPS for 
                                                 
15 Other studies investigating IPS frequently use R&D expenditures as an additional measure of investment. However, 
we are unable to analyze R&D expenditures due to data constraints.   
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treatment firms relative to contemporaneous changes for control firms. Under our hypothesis, we 
expect the sign of 4 to be positive and significant. 
4. Main Results 
 
In this section, we present our main empirical results. In Section 4.1, we discuss our 
analyses of how increased reporting frequency affected the relative investment stock price 
sensitivity of treatment firms in the post-treatment period. In Section 4.2, we analyze dynamic 
timing effects of increased reporting frequency to investigate the parallel trends assumption 
necessary for a difference-in-differences analysis. 
4.1 Increased reporting frequency and Investment Price Sensitivity 
The results for estimating Equation (1) are presented in Table 4 where CHG_PPE and 
CAPEX are the respective measures of investment. The full sample results are presented in 
Columns 1 and 2 while the mandatory sample results are shown in Columns 3 and 4. Since the two 
sets of results are similar, we focus our discussion on the full sample results. The results in 
Columns 1 and 2 show the coefficients on Q are positive and highly significant (p-values < 0.01). 
Thus, consistent with prior literature (Chen et al. 2007; Edmans et al. 2017), Q is positively 
associated with the level of investment, measured either by the one-year-ahead change in property, 
plant, and equipment or the one-year-ahead capital expenditure for non-treatment firms during the 
pre-treatment period. In addition, the POST×Q coefficients are small in absolute magnitude and 
not significantly different from zero. Thus, on average, the control firms did not experience a 
significant change in IPS during the post-treatment period.  
The coefficient on TREAT×Q captures the difference in IPS for treatment firms relative to 
control firms during the pre-treatment period. In both Columns 1 and 2, the TREAT×Q coefficient 
is negative and significant (p-values < 0.05). Thus, the IPS of treatment firms is significantly less 
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than that of control firms during the pre-treatment period. While we cannot causally attribute lower 
sensitivity of investments to stock prices during the pre-treatment period to their lower reporting 
frequency, this difference is consistent with our hypothesized effect of reporting frequency on IPS.  
Our main variable of interest is the interaction term TREAT×POST×Q, which captures the 
incremental change in IPS in the post-treatment period for treatment firms relative to the change 
experienced by controls firms. In both Columns 1 and 2, the TREAT×POST×Q coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that relative to the (insignificant) 
change experienced by controls firms, IPS increased significantly in the post-treatment period for 
treatment firms. The results for the mandatory sample in Columns 3 and 4 are similar. Both 
TREAT×POST×Q coefficients are significantly positive (p-values < 0.05) and their magnitudes 
are similar to but slightly smaller than their counterparts in Columns 1 and 2. Collectively, these 
findings indicate the increase in reporting frequency caused managers’ investment decisions to be 
more highly associated with stock prices.16  As such, they provide empirical support for our 
hypothesis that managers learn more new investment-related information from stock prices 
following an increase in reporting frequency. In addition, our results are consistent with the 
theoretical prediction in Goldstein and Yang (2019).  
To help in interpreting our regression results, we visual depict the Table 4 results in Figures 
2 and 3, which are based on the full and mandatory samples, respectively. In Panel A of each figure, 
we present the IPS results for when the change in PP&A is the dependent variable for the treatment 
and control firms in both the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. The equivalent IPS results 
when capital expenditures is the dependent variable are presented in Panel B.  
                                                 
16 The change in reporting frequency for the mandatory sample is based on exogenous regulatory shocks. In contrast, 
the decision to change reporting frequency for the voluntary switchers could be correlated with changes in IPS. Thus, 
our ability to more precisely identify the likely causal effects of the change in reporting frequency is higher for the 
mandatory sample. Since the results for both samples are similar, self-selection issues are less likely to be an issue. 
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The results across the two samples and the two investment measures are remarkably similar. 
During the pre-treatment period, the magnitudes of the mean IPS for the treatment firms are about 
one-fourth to one-third the magnitude of IPS for the control firms. Comparing the pre- and post-
treatment periods for the control firms shows that there is almost no difference in the mean value 
of IPS. Thus, there is no evidence of a structural break or trend in IPS for firms that do not change 
their reporting frequency. In stark contrast, the mean IPSs for the treatment firms are dramatically 
higher in the post-treatment period. The average increase is so large that in each panel, the mean 
value of IPS for treatment firms is larger than the corresponding values for control firms (although 
the differences are relatively small).  
As discussed above, the results show IPS was significantly lower for treatment firms than 
control firms during the pre-treatment period but increased significantly more for treatment firms 
compared to control firms in the post-treatment period. We attribute these differences to the effects 
of differences in reporting frequency on the investment-related information in stock prices as 
opposed to other differences between treatment and control firms. If our interpretation is correct, 
then one implication is that conditional on the control variables, IPS should be similar for treatment 
and control firms during the post-treatment period. During the post-treatment period, IPS for 
control firms is captured by the sum of the Q and POST×Q coefficients while IPS for treatment 
firms is captured by the sum of the Q, POST×Q, TREAT×POST, and TREAT×POST×Q 
coefficients. The results of untabulated F-tests indicates that the two sums are not significantly 
different from each other regardless of which measure of investment is used. These findings 
increase our ability to attribute the differences in IPS to the effects of reporting frequency.  
In addition to their statistical significance, the economic magnitude of the effects is large. 
This can be clearly seen in Figures 2 and 3. As discussed above, the average values of ISP for the 
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treatment firms go from substantially smaller than for the control firms to being larger during the 
post-treatment period. For example, when the change in PPE is the measure of investment, the 
magnitude of IPS for treatment firms during the pre-treatment period for the full sample is 0.005 
(= 0.0156 + -0.0111). The pre-treatment magnitude is only 32% of the magnitude for the control 
firms during the pre-treatment period (0.0156). However, during the post-treatment period, the 
magnitude for the treatment firms is 0.019 (= 0.005 + -0.00033 + 0.0145). This value is 24% 
greater than the value for the control firms (0.0153 = 0.0156 + -0.000331). In addition, the increase 
in IPS roughly corresponds to 15.9% of the standard deviation of change in property, plant, and 
equipment for the full sample, which further indicates an economically meaningful increase in the 
stock price informativeness to mangers. In summary, treatment firms substantially increased their 
reliance on stock price when making investment decisions during the post-treatment period.  
Lastly, it is worth discussing the results for POST and TREAT×POST. These results capture 
changes in the level of investment, as opposed to changes in IPS. The POST coefficients are 
negative and marginally significant (insignificant) in Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4). Thus, they suggest 
a marginal decrease (at most) in the level of investment for control firms during the post-treatment 
period. The TREAT×POST coefficients are all negative and significant (p-values < 0.05, 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.05, respectively). These results indicate that during the post-treatment period, treatment 
firms reduced their levels of investment relative to that of control firms. These results are consistent 
with those in Kraft et al. (2018), who also find the decrease is concentrated among treatment firms 
with longer investment cycles. They attribute their results to an increase in managerial myopia. We 
note that the investment level and IPS results are not inconsistent with each other as even myopic 
managers will use all available information, including that in stock prices, to make the best 
investment decisions given their horizon preferences. 
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4.2 Dynamic timing effect of reporting frequency increases on Investment Price Sensitivity  
An important assumption of the difference-in-differences research design is that prior to 
reporting frequency increases, treatment firms and control firms have similar trends in IPS (i.e., 
the parallel trends assumption). To provide evidence on the validity of this assumption and to better 
understand the dynamics of IPS over time, we modify Equation (1) and include POST(-1), 
POST(+1,+2), and POST(+3,+5) and their interactions with Q and TREAT. POST(-1) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the observation period is one year preceding the beginning of the 
treatment period, and zero otherwise. POST(+1,+2) {POST(+3,+5)} in an indicator variable equal 
to one if the observation period falls between one year and two years {three years and five years} 
after the beginning of the treatment period, and zero otherwise. 
The results from using the full sample (mandatory sample) are reported in Columns 1 and 
2 (3 and 4). They full sample results show that during the year preceding the treatment period, the 
magnitudes and changes in IPS are similar for treatment and control firms, as the coefficient on 
the interaction term TREAT×POST(-1)×Q is not significant. In contrast, the coefficients on 
TREAT×POST(+1,+2)×Q and TREAT×POST(+3,+5)×Q are positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that results are similar when we use the mandatory 
sample, although the significance levels are slightly lower. The fact that the increase in IPS is 
persistent for at least five years indicates the increase in reporting frequency results in a permanent 
change in the information environment. Thus, the results of this alternative specification provide 
additional evidence supporting our hypothesis as well as mitigate concerns over the validity of our 
research design.  
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4.3 Increases in reporting frequency and the managerial learning channel 
The evidence discussed above indicates investment levels at treatment firms were more 
highly associated with stock prices after they began to report more frequently relative to control 
firms. This result implies that managers at treatment firms behaved as if they believed their stock 
prices contained relatively more investment-related informative that was new to them during the 
post-treatment period. In other words, our results are consistent with the managerial learning 
channel (Chen et al. 2007; Edmans et al. 2017). 
Recall from Section 2 that the hypothesized managerial learning channel relies on the 
increase in financial reporting frequency leading to two changes in the information environment. 
First, there is an increase in private information incorporated into stock prices. Second, there must 
be an increase in the investment-related information in stock prices that is new to the manager. In 
this section, we conduct additional analyses to provide evidence on whether the changes in the 
information environment are consist with the managerial learning channel. 
In the first set of tests, we examine whether the relative increase in IPS for treatment firms 
is larger when stocks are more heavily traded by privately informed investors. More trading by 
informed investors will increase the amount of private information reflected in stock prices. To the 
extent at least some of this information represents investment-relevant information that is new to 
managers, then we expect the increase in IPS will be more pronounced for firms with more 
informed trading.  
Following Chen et al. (2007) and Jayaraman and Wu (2019), we proxy for the amount of 
private information in stock prices using stock price nonsynchronicity (1-R2) and the Amihud's 
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(2002) stock illiquidity measure.17 Stock price nonsynchronicity is a firm-specific measure equal 
to one minus the R-square from firm-specific regressions of firm level returns on market returns 
and industry returns (Durnev et al. 2003). Higher values correspond to more trading based on 
private information. Stock illiquidity is also a firm-specific measure estimated from the average of 
the ratio of daily unsigned stock returns scaled by dollar trading volume (multiplied by 106) 
expressed in percentage points (Amihud 2002). Higher values correspond to more trading based 
on private information. 
For each measure, we divide the sample into two subsamples as follows. In each year, we 
compute the median value of the measure (either (1-R2) or Illiquidity). Then based on that year’s 
median value, observations from that year are assigned to the high (low) group if the firm’s 
measure is above (below) the median value. This process is done separately for the full sample and 
the mandatory sample.18 This process results in four subsamples for the full sample (High (1-R2), 
Low (1-R2), High Illiquidity, Low Illiquidity) and four subsamples for the mandatory sample. For 
each subsample, we estimate Equation (1). The results using the full sample are presented in Panel 
A of Table 6 while the results from the mandatory sample are in presented in Panel B. For the sake 
of brevity, we do not tabulate the results for the control variables. The results using the mandatory 
sample are similar to those from the full sample. Thus, we focus on the full sample results.  
Column 1 presents the results for the High (1-R2) sample where the year-ahead change in 
PP&E is the dependent variable. The coefficient on the triple interaction variable of interest, 
TREAT×POST×Q, is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01). In addition, the magnitude of the 
                                                 
17 (Chen et al. 2007) also use the probability of informed trading (PIN) as an additional proxy. Constructing this 
measure requires intra-day data on trades and spreads (to sign the trades). This information is unavailable during our 
sample period, and hence, we are unable to use this measure. 
18 For the full sample, the set of the control firms is the same as before. For the mandatory sample, we follow (Kraft 
et al. 2018) and eliminate the small number of firms that reported three times in a year.  
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coefficient, 0.0392, is over twice as large as its Table 4 counterpart, 0.0145. In contrast, the 
TREAT×POST×Q coefficient in Column 2 for the Low (1-R2) sample is small in magnitude (-
0.00253) and not significant. The results in Columns 3 and 4 where the year-ahead capital 
expenditures is the dependent variable are similar. Specifically, the TREAT×POST×Q coefficient 
is positive and highly significant in the High (1-R2) sample but is insignificant in the Low (1-R2) 
sample. The corresponding results in Panel B for the mandatory sample are qualitative similar with 
positive and significant coefficients in the High (1-R2) sample but insignificant coefficients in the 
Low (1-R2) sample. 
The corresponding full sample results when Illiquidity is used to create the subsamples are 
presented in Columns 5 – 8. The pattern of results is similar to that in Columns 1 – 4. Specifically, 
the TREAT×POST×Q coefficients are positive and significant (p-values < 0.05) for the High 
Illiquidity subsample but are small in magnitude and insignificant in the Low Illiquidity subsample.  
In summary, when the stocks of treatment firms have relatively high levels of privately 
information trading, IPS is significantly higher following the increase in quarterly reporting 
relative to control firms. In contrast, treatment firms exhibit no significant increase in IPS 
following the increase in quarterly reporting relative to control firms when there is relatively little 
informed trading in their stocks. Overall, the results in Table 6 are consistent with our expectations. 
When stocks are expected to contain relatively high amounts of private information, managers 
appear to place more weight on this information when making their investment decisions, and 
vice-versa.   
According to the managerial learning channel, managers increase their reliance on stock 
prices when making investment decisions when they think stock prices contain information that is 
superior to their own. If descriptive, then our prior results indicate that managers will have made 
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relatively better (or more informed) investment decisions during the post-treatment period given 
the improvement in their information sets. In which case, we expect the future operating 
performance of treatment firms’ will improve relative to control firms as they make more informed 
investment decisions. 
In our second set of tests, we provide evidence on this implication of the managerial 
learning channel by examining whether increases in reporting frequency are positively associated 
with future return on assets (ROA). Specifically, we estimate versions of Equation (1) where either 
1. ROA in the following year (ROA [+1]), 2. the average annual ROA over the next two years 
(ROA [+1, +2], and 3. the average annual ROA over the next three years (ROA [+1, +3]. The 
results for the full sample are presented in Columns 1 – 3 of Table 7, and the mandatory sample 
results are presented in Columns 4 – 6. 
The main coefficient of interest is the TREAT×POST interaction variable. Its coefficient 
captures the incremental change in future ROA for treatment firms in the post-treatment period 
relative to the concurrent change experienced by the control firms. In each of Columns 1 – 3, the 
TREAT×POST coefficient is positive and significant (p-values < 0.10). For the mandatory sample, 
the results in Columns 5 and 6 also show the TREAT×POST coefficients are positive and 
significant (p-values < 0.05 and 0.10, respectively). However, when average ROA over the next 
three years is the dependent variable, the TREAT×POST coefficient is insignificant. Overall, the 
future profitability results in Table 7 are consistent with managers making relatively better 
investment decisions during the post-treatment period, when their investment decisions are also 
more highly associated with stock prices. Thus, the results in Table 7 provide additional 
corroborating evidence that our main IPS results are due to the managerial learning channel. 
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4.4. Financial Constraints Channel  
In this section, we examine an alternative explanation for our results based on the financial 
constraints channel (Baker et al. 2003). They argue that when firms are financially constrained, 
they need to rely more on equity issuances to fund their investments. Given the costs and frictions 
associated with issuing equity, constrained firms are unable to finance their optimal investment 
plans. In which case, increases (decreases) in equity prices will relax (tighten) these constraints, 
and equity-dependent firms will respond by increasing (decreasing) their level of investment 
accordingly. Thus, investments are positively correlated with stock prices (i.e., IPS is positive) but 
this correlation does not imply managers are learning about the profitability of their investment 
opportunities from stock prices. Consistent with this reasoning, Baker et al. (2003) predict and find 
IPS is increasing in the level of financial constraints.  
In order to provide evidence on the validity of this alternative explanation, we examine 
whether the relative increase in IPS for treatment firms during the post-treatment period is higher 
for more financing constrained treatment firms. Similar to the procedures used in Table 6, we 
divide the sample into more and less equity dependent subsamples using three different measures 
of financing constraints used in prior literature. The first two measures are firm age (AGE) and 
firm size (SIZE). Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that these two variables are the most reliable 
measures of financing constraints that they examine, where younger firms and smaller firms face 
higher financing constraints. We also use the KZ index developed in Baker et al. (2003), which is 
also used in Chen et al. (2007).  
For each measure, we split the sample based on the cross-sectional median annual value of 
the constraints measure. We designate the group of firms with above median values of financing 
constraints as HIGH FC, and the group of firms with below median values of financing constraints 
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as Low FC. We then modify Equation (1) and allow our interaction variable of interest, 
TREAT×POST×Q, to take on different values for the HIGH FC and LOW FC groups. The results 
for the full sample (mandatory sample) are reported in Panel A (Panel B) of Table 8. 
The full sample results show that for each measure of financing constraints and each 
measure of investment, the TREAT×POST×Q coefficient is positive and significant for the LOW 
FC group (five of six p-values < 0.01). In contrast, none of the TREAT×POST×Q coefficients are 
significant for the HIGH FC group.19  The results in Panel B for the mandatory sample are 
qualitatively the same: all of the TREAT×POST×Q coefficients are significant for the LOW FC 
group at the 5% level or better while none of the TREAT×POST×Q coefficients are significant for 
the HIGH FC group. In summary, the evidence does not support the alternative explanation that 
our results are being driven by the financial constraints channel. Instead, the evidence is most 
consistent with the learning channel. In addition, the evidence is also consistent with the intuition 
in Chen et al. (2007) that the managers of the less financially constrained firms can respond to 
information in their firm’s stock price more easily in adjusting their investments.  
 5. Summary and Conclusion 
Mandatory reporting frequency is an important but difficult regulatory design choice 
because it fundamentally affects the information environment for publicly traded firms. The 
difficulty in determining the optimal reporting frequency occurs because reporting frequency 
affects the incentives of numerous market participants, including analysts, investors, creditors, 
competitors, as well as managers, in diverse and often imperfectly understood ways. Not 
surprisingly, financial reporting frequency has been a controversial issue subject to much policy 
                                                 
19 These results are inconsistent with those in Baker et al. (2003), who rely on the KZ measure of financing constraints 
(Kaplan and Zingales 1997). As shown in Hadlock and Pierce (2010), the KZ measure is an unreliable measure of 
financing constraints. Therefore, the differences between our results and those in Baker et al. (2003) maybe due 
measurement errors in the KZ measure. 
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debate globally. In this paper, we provide evidence relevant to this debate by examining how 
financial reporting affects the degree to which managers rely on information in stock prices to 
make their investment decisions in a setting that allows for causal inferences.  
We examine changes in U.S. firms’ financial reporting frequency over the period 1951-
1974. During this period, the SEC first increased the mandatory reporting frequency from annual 
to semi-annual in 1955 and then from semi-annual to quarterly in 1970. We use investment-to-
price sensitivity (hereafter, IPS) to measure the degree to which managers learn new information 
about the value of their investment opportunities from stock prices (Bakke and Whited 2010; Chen 
et al. 2007; Edmans et al. 2017; Foucault and Fresard 2012; Jayaraman and Wu 2019).  
Our primary results indicate IPS significantly increased for treatment firms following the 
increase in reporting frequency compared to control firms. We find the increase in reporting 
frequency resulted in long-lasting increases in IPS as the effects are significant for at least five 
years following the increase in reporting frequency. The results are economically significant as 
well. Thus, consistent with our hypothesis, the evidence indicates managers of treatment firms 
behaved as if their stock prices contained more information about investment opportunities when 
they made their investment decisions during the post-adoption period. 
The results from additional tests provide corroborating evidence that our results are driven 
by the managerial learning channel, as we hypothesize. Specifically, we find the relative increase 
in investment-stock price sensitivity is concentrated among firms whose stocks have relatively 
high levels of informed trading. This finding is consistent with informed investors impounding 
investment-related information in stock prices through their trading activities. In addition, we find 
evidence that following the increase in reporting frequency, managers at treatment firms make 
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relatively more investment decisions. Thus, our results indicate a real effect of reporting frequency 
on the quality of firms’ investment decisions. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable Definition 
CHG_PPEt+1 One period ahead change in net property plant and equipment (PPENTt+1 - PPENT) divided by total assets (AT)  
CAPEXt+1 One period ahead capital expenditure (CAPXt+1) divided by total assets (AT) 
Q Tobin’s Q calculated as market value of assets divided by book value of assets. 
AT Total Assets in $millions 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets 
CF Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation (IB + DP) divided by total assets (AT) 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT) 
SALESGROWTH Percentage change in sales (SALE) 
LIQUIDITY Current assets (ACT) divided by current liabilities (LCT) 
KZ Index 
Four-variable KZ score (excluding Q) per Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), measured by a weighted sum of cash flow (CFt), cash 
dividends (DIVt), and cash balances (Ct), all scaled by beginning-of-
year assets (At-1), as well as leverage ratio (LEV): KZ4 = 
−1.002×CFit/Ait−1−39.368×DIVit/Ait−1−1.315×Cit/Ait−1+3.139×LEVit 
1-R2 One minus the R-square from regressions of firm level returns on market returns and industry returns as per Durnev et al. (2003) 
ILLIQ 
The average of the ratio of daily unsigned stock returns scaled by 
dollar trading volume multiplied by 106, expressed in percentage 
points, following Amihud (2002) 
TREAT A dummy variable which equals 1 for firms that increase their reporting frequency, and 0 otherwise. 
POST A dummy variable which equals 1 for firms-year observations after the treatment year, and 0 otherwise. 
ROA Income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by total assets (AT) 
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Figure 1. Timeline of key dates in the SEC’s regulation of financial reporting frequency. 
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Figure 2 - Full Sample 
Panel A: Investment measured by the change in Property, Plant, & Equipment 
 
 
Panel B: Investment measured by the Capital Expenditures 
 
 
Figure 2 is based on the full sample results from Table 4, Panel A, estimated using Equation (1). Figure 2 
shows the trend in investment-price sensitivity for treatment and control firms before and after reporting 
frequency increases for control firms, and after controlling for changes in the control variables and fixed 
effects. 
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Figure 3 - Mandatory Sample 
Panel A: Investment measured by the change in Property, Plant, & Equipment 
 
 
Panel B: Investment measured by the Capital Expenditures 
 
Figure 3 is based on the mandatory sample results from Table 4, Panel B, estimated using Equation (1). 
Figure 3 shows the trend in investment-price sensitivity for treatment and control firms before and after 
reporting frequency increases for control firms, and after controlling for changes in the control variables 
and fixed effects. 
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Table 1 – Sample distribution and matching statistics  
Panel A: Distribution of treatment firms 
Increases in reporting 
frequency to Full sample Mandatory sample 
 
Twice a year (semi-annual) 149 128 
Three time a year 141 0 
Four time a year (quarterly) 596 364 
 
Total 886 492 
 
 
Panel B: Comparison of matching variables 
  Full sample   Mandatory sample 
Variable 
Treatment 
firm 
means 
Control 
firm 
means 
Mean 
difference 
t-value   
Treatment 
firm 
means 
Control 
firm 
means 
Mean 
difference 
t-value 
SIZE 3.231 3.261 -0.493 3.071 3.123 -0.645
ROA 0.062 0.063 -0.406 0.064 0.065 -0.216
SALESGROWTH 0.202 0.202 -0.028 0.198 0.194 0.180
LEVERAGE 0.142 0.141 0.169 0.137 0.135 0.285
    
N 886 886     492 492   
 
Notes: Panel A provides the frequency distribution of treatment firms with reporting frequency increase 
across years 1951–1974 both for the full sample (include firms with voluntary and involuntary increases in 
reporting frequency) and the mandatory sample (involuntary increases in reporting frequency). Panel B 
presents the means of firm characteristics used for matching for treatment firm and control firms along with 
the t-values of differences in the mean values for both the full sample and mandatory sample.  
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample 
Variable Mean SD P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 N
CHG_PPEt+1 0.045 0.091 -0.111 0.000 0.022 0.062 0.497 11,364
CAPEXt+1 0.083 0.078 0.003 0.034 0.061 0.104 0.439 11,364
Q 1.881 1.393 0.579 1.164 1.561 2.173 6.702 11,364
TOTAL ASSETS ($'million) 97 237 2 13 30 77 1253 11,364
SIZE 3.579 1.295 1.224 2.644 3.431 4.362 7.134 11,364
CF 0.098 0.057 -0.060 0.068 0.098 0.128 0.237 11,364
LEVERAGE 0.145 0.129 0.000 0.029 0.129 0.225 0.547 11,364
SALESGROWTH 0.160 0.327 -0.380 0.020 0.102 0.216 1.969 11,364
LIQUIDITY 2.784 1.378 0.729 1.873 2.480 3.334 8.846 11,364
 
Panel B: Mandatory sample 
Variable Mean SD P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 N
CHG_PPEt+1 0.046 0.091 -0.119 -0.001 0.022 0.063 0.496 6,180
CAPEXt+1 0.083 0.079 0.003 0.034 0.061 0.106 0.472 6,180
Q 1.807 1.467 0.556 1.069 1.484 2.091 6.434 6,180
TOTAL ASSETS ($'million) 91 262 2 11 25 60 1378 6,180
SIZE 3.396 1.296 1.189 2.453 3.239 4.116 7.229 6,180
CF 0.097 0.059 -0.071 0.064 0.096 0.129 0.245 6,180
LEVERAGE 0.149 0.134 0.000 0.028 0.129 0.232 0.549 6,180
SALESGROWTH 0.163 0.316 -0.367 0.020 0.107 0.224 1.645 6,180
LIQUIDITY 2.733 1.385 0.707 1.818 2.423 3.285 8.974 6,180
 
Notes: Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables for the treatment and control firms for both the full sample (Panel A) and the 
mandatory sample (Panel B). For both samples, we consider data for up to five years before and five years after the treatment year.  Please refer to 
the Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 3 – Correlations 
 
No. Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 CHG_PPEt+1  0.786 0.193 -0.022 0.217 0.004 0.198 -0.017 
2 CAPEXt+1 0.789 0.197 0.004 0.196 0.039 0.168 -0.108 
3 Q 0.199 0.188 -0.079 0.346 -0.166 0.166 0.043 
4 SIZE -0.050 -0.017 -0.092 -0.044 0.236 0.046 -0.146 
5 CF 0.179 0.154 0.345 -0.007 -0.350 0.192 0.150 
6 LEVERAGE 0.016 0.055 -0.188 0.159 -0.357  0.113 -0.209 
7 SALESGROWTH 0.177 0.154 0.158 0.012 0.179 0.074 -0.152 
8 LIQUIDITY -0.067 -0.142 0.055 -0.122 0.151 -0.170 -0.166   
 
Notes: Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations for the main variables for the full sample (below the diagonal) and the mandatory sample (above 
the diagonal). Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 4 – Increase in reporting frequency increases and investment stock price sensitivity  
 Full sample Mandatory sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 
          
Q 0.0156*** 0.0105*** 0.0139*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.00346) (0.00237) (0.00343) (0.00272) 
TREAT x Q -0.0111** -0.00723** -0.0117*** -0.0126*** 
 (0.00459) (0.00315) (0.00397) (0.00322) 
POST x Q -0.000331 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00228 
 (0.00325) (0.00236) (0.00414) (0.00373) 
TREAT x POST x Q 0.0145*** 0.0104*** 0.0129** 0.0122** 
 (0.00481) (0.00355) (0.00569) (0.00474) 
TREAT x POST -0.0236** -0.0139* -0.0234** -0.0249*** 
 (0.00970) (0.00764) (0.0114) (0.00921) 
POST -0.0122* -0.00263 -0.0182* -0.000584 
 (0.00695) (0.00556) (0.00932) (0.00720) 
POST x CF 0.0641 0.0179 0.147** 0.0385 
 (0.0553) (0.0496) (0.0654) (0.0544) 
TREAT x POST x CF -0.0993 -0.0962 -0.100 -0.0348 
 (0.0628) (0.0588) (0.0765) (0.0648) 
CF 0.141*** 0.151*** 0.143*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0497) (0.0525) (0.0428) 
SIZE -0.0610*** -0.0385*** -0.0533*** -0.0330*** 
 (0.00554) (0.00466) (0.00726) (0.00553) 
LEVERAGE -0.148*** -0.108*** -0.132*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0148) (0.0250) (0.0179) 
SALESGROWTH 0.0187*** 0.0112*** 0.0222*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.00459) (0.00323) (0.00597) (0.00404) 
LIQUIDITY 0.00652*** 0.00372*** 0.0113*** 0.00594***
 (0.00168) (0.00134) (0.00248) (0.00193) 
   
Firm YES YES YES YES 
Industy x Year YES YES YES YES 
   
Observations 11,364 11,364 6,180 6,180 
R-squared 0.414 0.534 0.427 0.571 
          
Notes: This table reports the regression results of Equation (1) for the full sample and the mandatory sample 
providing evidence of the effect of reporting frequency on IPS. Please refer to the Appendix for variable 
definitions. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are obtained by clustering at the firm level.
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Table 5 – Dynamic timing effect of reporting frequency increases on investment stock price 
sensitivity  
 Full sample Mandatory sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 
       
TREAT x POST(-1) x Q 0.00405 0.00266 0.00523 0.00333 
 (0.00293) (0.00209) (0.00432) (0.00280) 
TREAT x POST(+1,+2) x Q 0.0163*** 0.0125*** 0.0142** 0.0135*** 
 (0.00461) (0.00342) (0.00559) (0.00465) 
TREAT x POST(+3,+5) x Q 0.0147*** 0.00980*** 0.0129** 0.0118** 
 (0.00475) (0.00355) (0.00557) (0.00470) 
  
  
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Firm YES YES YES YES 
Industry x Year YES YES YES YES 
  
Observations 11,364 11,364 6,180 6,180 
R-squared 0.415 0.535 0.430 0.572 
          
 
Notes: This table provide evidence on the timing of the effect of reporting frequency on IPS for both the 
full sample and the mandatory sample. Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** 
Denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are obtained by clustering at the firm level. 
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Table 6 – Reporting frequency increases, investment stock price sensitivity, and privately informed trading 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HIGH 1-R2 LOW 1-R2 HIGH 1-R2 LOW 1-R2 HIGH ILLIQ LOW ILLIQ HIGH ILLIQ LOW ILLIQ
Variable CHG_PPEt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CAPEXt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CAPEXt+1
Q 0.0238*** 0.00449 0.0141** 0.00194 0.0302*** 0.00840* 0.0211*** 0.00483
(0.00595) (0.00521) (0.00548) (0.00358) (0.00880) (0.00458) (0.00612) (0.00328)
TREAT x Q -0.0201** 0.00219 -0.00988 -0.00134 -0.0227* 0.00578 -0.0105 0.000545
(0.00863) (0.0114) (0.00725) (0.00644) (0.0131) (0.00831) (0.00848) (0.00565)
POST x Q -0.00908 0.0103* -0.00167 0.00714* -0.0124 0.00432 -0.00926 0.00509*
(0.00820) (0.00531) (0.00663) (0.00366) (0.00963) (0.00429) (0.00680) (0.00307)
TREAT x POST x Q 0.0392*** -0.00253 0.0242*** 0.000582 0.0355** -0.00692 0.0236** -0.00294
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.00870) (0.00675) (0.0164) (0.00812) (0.0105) (0.00576)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry x Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,069 4,151 4,069 4,157 4,439 4,445 4,439 4,445
R-squared 0.558 0.606 0.649 0.716 0.511 0.560 0.613 0.690
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Panel B: Mandatory sample 
 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of Equation (1) for the full sample (Panel A) and the mandatory sample (Panel B) conditional on 
informativeness of trades. We measure informativeness of trades using 1-R2 and illiquidity (ILLIQ). Firms are split into high and low in terms of 
the informativeness of trades based on the median values 1-R2 and ILLIQ. Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** Denote 
statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are 
obtained by clustering at the firm level.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HIGH 1-R2 LOW 1-R2 HIGH 1-R2 LOW 1-R2 HIGH ILLIQ LOW ILLIQ HIGH ILLIQ LOW ILLIQ
Variable CHG_PPEt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CAPEXt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CAPEXt+1
Q 0.0207*** 0.0169** 0.0267*** 0.0130** 0.0244*** 0.0148** 0.0312*** 0.0119***
(0.00644) (0.00682) (0.00793) (0.00508) (0.00901) (0.00629) (0.00725) (0.00419)
TREAT x Q -0.0111 -0.0133 -0.0164* -0.0104 -0.0247 -0.0101 -0.0227** -0.00815
(0.00787) (0.0131) (0.00931) (0.00979) (0.0172) (0.00909) (0.0113) (0.00839)
POST x Q -0.00467 0.00574 -0.00750 0.000193 -0.00429 -0.00186 -0.0145 -0.00226
(0.00928) (0.00812) (0.00974) (0.00639) (0.0115) (0.00677) (0.00897) (0.00546)
TREAT x POST x Q 0.0310*** 0.00270 0.0264** 0.00642 0.0343* 0.00541 0.0329** 0.00499
(0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0113) (0.00984) (0.0200) (0.0101) (0.0141) (0.00928)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry x Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,301 2,301 2,301 2,301 2,436 2,439 2,436 2,439
R-squared 0.570 0.659 0.679 0.739 0.509 0.589 0.610 0.736
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Table 7 – Increases in reporting frequency and future profitability 
 
Notes: This table reports regression results that provide evidence of the effect of reporting frequency on future profitability. Please refer to the 
Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are obtained by clustering at the firm level. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable ROA [+1] ROA [+1,+2] ROA [+1,+3] ROA [+1] ROA [+1,+2] ROA [+1,+3]
TREAT x POST 0.00446* 0.00430* 0.00358* 0.00721** 0.00592* 0.00455
(0.00232) (0.00222) (0.00212) (0.00353) (0.00349) (0.00343)
POST -0.00398* -0.00406** -0.00367** -0.00787*** -0.00624** -0.00452*
(0.00215) (0.00197) (0.00176) (0.00299) (0.00280) (0.00252)
SIZE -0.0151*** -0.0171*** -0.0164*** -0.0170*** -0.0203*** -0.0208***
(0.00246) (0.00230) (0.00214) (0.00344) (0.00344) (0.00331)
LEVERAGE -0.0365*** -0.0117 0.000590 -0.0363*** -0.00241 0.0116
(0.00902) (0.00827) (0.00803) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.00943)
SALESGROWTH 0.0160*** 0.00871*** 0.00543*** 0.0178*** 0.00929*** 0.00507***
(0.00174) (0.00144) (0.00116) (0.00247) (0.00202) (0.00162)
LIQUIDITY -0.00186*** -0.00211*** -0.00208*** -0.000619 -0.00111 -0.00154**
(0.000678) (0.000606) (0.000524) (0.000967) (0.000818) (0.000733)
Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry x Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,362 10,854 10,283 6,177 5,794 5,401
R-squared 0.652 0.731 0.792 0.654 0.740 0.802
Full Sample Mandatory sample
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Table 8 – Increases in reporting frequency increases, investment stock price sensitivity, and financing constraints 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable CHG_PPE CAPEX CHG_PPE CAPEX CHG_PPE CAPEX
TREAT x POST x Q (HIGH FC) 0.00872 0.00446 0.00584 0.00197 0.00138 -0.00135
(0.00727) (0.00573) (0.00676) (0.00519) (0.00616) (0.00493)
TREAT x POST x Q (LOW FC) 0.0129*** 0.00905** 0.0134*** 0.00930*** 0.0144*** 0.0110***
(0.00484) (0.00356) (0.00477) (0.00357) (0.00463) (0.00365)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry x Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,364 11,364 11,364 11,364 10,125 10,125
R-squared 0.417 0.536 0.417 0.536 0.418 0.533
AGE SIZE KZ Index
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Panel B: Mandatory sample 
 
Notes: This table provides evidence of the effect of reporting frequency increases on IPS conditional on financing constraints (FC). FC are measured 
using firm age, firm size, and KZ index. We create dummy variables based on the medians of each FC variable using the period before the treatment 
year. Coefficient estimates are obtained from a modified version of Equation (1) which allows coefficients to vary across different levels of FC. 
Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for the full (mandatory) sample. Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** Denote 
statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are 
obtained by clustering at the firm level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1 CHG_PPEt+1 CAPEXt+1
TREAT x POST x Q (HIGH FC) 0.00448 0.00226 0.000300 -0.000861 0.00677 0.00911
(0.00934) (0.00718) (0.00878) (0.00690) (0.00735) (0.00616)
TREAT x POST x Q (LOW FC) 0.0133** 0.0127*** 0.0170*** 0.0136*** 0.0130** 0.0108**
(0.00567) (0.00482) (0.00633) (0.00525) (0.00649) (0.00536)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry x Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,180 6,180 6,180 6,180 5,390 5,390
R-squared 0.429 0.572 0.429 0.574 0.418 0.561
AGE SIZE KZ Index
